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CONTROLS OVER ATOMS-FOR-PEACE:
SOME FACTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT*
Stephen Gorove**
One of the pressing exigencies of our time has been the estab-
lishment of international control procedures to assure that the
immense power of the atom will not be unleashed for global
destruction but will serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. The
finding of a generally accepted scheme has been greatly ham-
pered by the well-known political, ideological, and other differ-
ences which divide the world arena today.
Thwarted in their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament,
Western and, in particular, American policy makers, set out to
attain more limited goals, such as the conclusion of international
control agreements to ensure that atoms destined for peaceful
purposes will not be diverted to military uses. It was hoped
that such procedure would keep the door open toward atomic
industrial progress without enhancing the chances of prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. It was also hoped that the setting up
of controls over the civilian applications of atomic energy would
constitute a helpful step in creating institutions and practices
which might be conducive to the eventual establishment of inter-
national controls over its military uses. The expected quid pro
quo in terms of nuclear assistance, technological advancement
and other benefits has made acceptance of foreign control pro-
cedures more palatable to many nations.
International control over atoms destined for peaceful pur-
poses constitutes a large and complex order. If we look at the
panorama of institutional arrangements, we find broad varia-
tions in regard to over-all structure, historical background, pur-
pose, allocation of authority, methods and achievements.
*This article-an elaboration of the author's address before the Washington
World Peace Through Law Conference on September 16, 1965-is the outgrowth
of a study and on-the-spot survey sponsored by the American Society of Inter-
national Law involving international procedures and techniques developed to con-
trol the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The author gratefully acknowledges the
generous support and counsel obtained from the Society and its Advisory Group.
For the text of the article, including the views advanced therein, the responsibility
rests with the author.
**Professor of Law, University of Mississippi.
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CONTROLS OVER ATOMS
The control systems are incorporated in a network of inter-
national bilateral accords' as well as international multilateral
agreements, such as those establishing the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) ,2 the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom),3 the European Nuclear Energy Agency
(ENEA) of the Organization of European Economic Coopera-
tion (OEEC), now known as the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) .4
It has been said, with some justification, that no geographer
in his right mind would have ever invented what used to be
known as the British Commonwealth of Nations. As a parallel,
perhaps it is not entirely inappropriate to observe that no lawyer
would have likely devised the existing framework of inter-
national control systems over the peaceful uses of atomic energy
with their manifold multiplications, especially with regard to
their membership and their intricate differentiations in terms
of the authority they exercise over certain designated people,
resources, and institutions.
At the present time, international control in the field of
atomic energy is still in its infancy due not only to the obvious
fact that man's use of the atom is itself of a relatively recent
origin but also to the fact that the establishment of such control
over its military uses met with serious, if not insurmountable,
obstacles in view of national rivalries, and security and defense
1. Detailed discussions of the bilateral control systems may be found in Gorove,
Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace: U.S. Bilateral Agreements with other Nations, 4
-COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181 (1966) ; Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace Under
Canadian Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 42 DENVER L. CENTER J. 41
(1965) ; Gorove, Safeguarding Atoms-for-Peace: U. K. Bilateral Agreements with
Other Nations, 68 W. VA. L. REV. 263 (1966) ; Seaborg, Existing Arrangements
for International Control of Warlike Material-5: the United States Program of
Bilateral Safeguards, 2 DISARMAMENT & ARMS CONTROL 442 (1964).
2. For background information as well as recent appraisals, see Bechhoefer &
Stein, Atoms for Peace, 55 MICH. L. REV. 747 (1957) ; Gorove, Humanizing the
Atom: Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 N.Y.L.F. 245
(1957) ; Simsarian, Inspection Experience Under the Antarctic Treaty and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1966) ; Willrich,
Safegarding Atoms for Peace, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 34 (1966).
3. A comprehensive account and evaluation of Euratom's control machinery
is presented in Gorove, The First Multinational Atomic Inspection and Control
System at Work: Euratom's Experience, 18 STAN. L. REV. 160 (1965). For
briefer assessments, see Gorove, Lessons From the Control of the Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy in Euratom, 1964 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L.
136; VAN BELMONT, LE CONTROLE D'EURATO-M, Expos FAIT A L'ASSOCIATION
ALLEMANDE DE POLITIQUE EXT~tRIEURE A BONN (Feb. 22, 1963, mimeo.).
4. For an informative article on ENEA's security control system, see Vignes,
Le Systdme de Contrdle de Sdcuritd de l'Agence Europdenne pour l'Energie
Nucldaire, 7 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 555 (1961).
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considerations - the paramount factors which determine nation-
state policies in this age of ours. To these same factors we must
also attribute the current, severe limitations on the purpose and
scope of application of international controls over the peaceful
uses of atomic energy.
The various control systems which have come into existence
not only reveal some striking parallels but also exhibit many
curious dissimilarities. While the over-all objective of safe-
guards is generally the prevention of diversion of designated
items from peaceful to military purposes, the criteria distin-
guishing such purposes or uses have not been circumscribed.
However, many bilateral agreements, as well as some IAEA
discussions, have borne out the changing nature and relativity
of such criteria and have provided certain clues for their deter-
mination, in addition to ENEA's limited delineation, according
to which military purpose includes the use of special fissionable
materials in weapons of war and excludes their use in reactors
for the production of electricity and heat or for propulsion. 5
Apart from the general aim of assuring nondiversion from
peaceful to military purposes, international control frequently
has such concomitant lesser objectives as the prevention of losses
and unauthorized transfer of materials, the nonalteration of
irradiated fuel elements' form and content, the approval of re-
processing, and the return of fuel to the supplying party.6
In case of the ENEA, control applies basically only to the
operation of joint undertakings and to materials, equipment, fa-
cilities, and services which are made available by the agency or
under its supervision.' The IAEA control system is even more re-
stricted, applying primarily only to cases where assistance is
provided by the agency or at its request, or under its super-
vision 8 It is, of course, possible both in the ENEA of OECD
and in the IAEA to apply safeguards, at the request of the par-
ties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or to any
activities of a requesting state in the field of atomic energy.9
5. See art. 17 of the Convention on the Establishment of a Security Control
in the Field of Nuclear Energy of Dec. 20, 1957 [hereinafter cited as Security
Control Convention], reprinted in 53 Ami. J. INT'L L. 1018, 1025 (1959).
6. See, for instance, Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace: U.S. Bilateral
Agreements with Other Nations, 4 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181, 186, 187, 191
(1966).
7. Security Control Convention art. 1(a).
8. Stat. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [hereinafter cited as IAEA Stat.], art.
III, A(5).
9. Security Control Convention, art, 1(b); IAEA Stat. art. III, A(5).
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Euratom, in a sense, constitutes an exceptional system in
that it pledges to ensure nondiversion of materials from peaceful
to military uses basically only if the community entered into an
agreement to this effect with a third country or an international
organization, or in the case where the user, whose declared inten-
tion was peaceful utilization, failed to notify the agency of his
change of purpose and actually used the materials for military
objectives. Apart from this, the purpose of Euratom's safety
control is to satisfy itself that ores, source materials and special
fissionable materials are not diverted from their intended uses
(whatever these uses may be) as stated by the users.'
Furthermore, the system applied by the community specifi-
cally excludes control of any materials which are intended for
the purposes of defense insofar as they are in the course of
being specially prepared for such purposes or which, after being
so prepared, are, in accordance with an operational plan, in-
stalled, or stocked in a military establishment." Within these
general limitations, however, the safety network of Euratom is
broader in coverage than its ENEA and IAEA counterparts
since the control applies to all other atomic undertakings of the
member states.12
The control systems reveal substantial differences in terms
of the composition of the various organs as well as in terms of
the degree and complexity of the formal and effective control
exercised by them. The wide gamut of variables has been
brought about by the peculiar characteristics of each machinery
and the circumstances in which each system was born. On the
other hand, except in those few cases where there is sufficient
confidence among the parties to justify a simple written pledge,
the regular control methods employed by the supervising bodies
-such as the examination of the design of installations, the
maintenance of accounting records, the transmission of periodic
reports and on-the-spot inspection- exhibit more similarities
than differences.' 3 The reason for this must be sought in the
10. Art. 77 of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom), 298 U.N.T.S. 171, substantially reproduced in 51 Am. J. INT'L
L. 955 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Treaty].
11. Treaty art. 84.
12. For details, see Gorove, The First Multinational Atomic Inspection and
Control System at Work: Euratom'a Experience, 18 STAN. L. REav. 160, 164
(1965).
13. Examples of bilateral agreements which contain no control provisions but
satisfy themselves with a mere written pledge may be found in Gorove, Controls
Over Atoms-for-Peace: U.S. Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 4 COL. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 181, 189 (1966).
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fact that the various types of control have been patterned after
the bilaterals which, in turn, have aimed at eventual consistency
with the safeguards procedures of the IAEA. This was the
result of advance planning and coordination, prompted not only
by enlightened United States leadership but by the equally en-
lightened readiness of other powers to follow suit.14
The actual application and choice of the particular control
procedures depends greatly on the nature and amount of mate-
rials involved, the scope and character of each project, the
chances of diversion, the techniques available for detecting vio-
lations, the cooperation of the receiving authorities, and many
other factors, such as the type of installations involved and even
considerations of moderation and balancing of interests.
All control systems seem to have been set up with a realiza-
tion of the fact that where the possibility of violation is great
and the expected advantage is substantial, the need for rigorous
efforts of detection is most imperative.
While stringent safeguards over nuclear materials and fa-
cilities are likely to reduce the chances of diversion, available
evidence seems to indicate that there is no completely foolproof
system in existence which would automatically guarantee the
detection of all evasions at once, a fact which all international
security controls over the peaceful uses of atomic energy have
taken into account. To be sure, new devices may revolutionize
the art of detection, but it is impossible to place and keep in-
spectors all the time at locations where fraud may be perpetrated
and, even then, the element of human fallibility would remain.
On the whole, the various control systems have operated
smoothly, without serious difficulties. The fact that no diver-
sion or misuse, to my knowledge, has been discovered or reported,
if such is the case, may not necessarily be due to the efficiency
of the inspection and control system. In some instances, it may
be due to the fact that the incentive for fraud has not been par-
ticularly great since nuclear materials are in relative abundance.
Insofar as sanctions are concerned, while most control sys-
tems require requests by the control organization for remedial
steps before applying punitive measures for noncompliance, and
14. Compare 3 Background Material for the Review of the International
Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States, Report to the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 851 (Comm. Print 1960).
[Vol. XXVII
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make provision for professional secrecy as well as reparation of
damage, it is noteworthy that, in the IAEA, unlike Euratom or
the ENEA, only the recipient state can challenge the decisions
of the international control authority and invoke, if necessary,
the disputes procedure provided for in the IAEA Statute or
in the relevant agreement.1 5 In the bilateral agreements there
are no provisions included for arbitral or judicial settlement,
largely because disputes have not been regarded as amenable
to such procedures. 16
Turning to an evaluation of international control over the
peaceful uses of atomic energy, it appears, on the one hand, that
its fundamental purpose - the slowing down of proliferation
of nuclear arms - has been an intermediary and negative con-
cept short of a better solution acceptable to all states concerned.
On the other hand, the acceptance by many nations of the bi-
laterals and, subsequently, in many cases, of the regional and
IAEA safeguards, seems to constitute a significant wedge in
the formerly impregnable wall of sovereignty.
One lesson from Euratom's experience which may have some
implications for disarmament is that, even in such a closely knit
regional group as the community - composed of states having
similar backgrounds, with many common interests and strong
economic affiliations - controls could only be extended to areas
not touching upon vital national security interests, which still
seem to be the most significant impediments in the way of
acceptance of such controls. Thus it has not been possible to
set up an all-embracing control system to ensure exclusively
peaceful uses of the atom or to surrender ultimate control en-
forcement to the community.
In most general terms, the case of international control over
the peaceful uses of atomic energy seems to underscore five
essential points, namely, that progress in this sensitive area is
likely to be made: (1) if national security interests are not
adversely affected; (2) if there are some tangible incentives,
actual or potential, present to counterbalance deterrents; (3) if
carefully chosen and extremely limited objectives are set; (4)
if a delicate organizational and operational network of checks
15. Consult IAEA Stat. art. XVII, (A) ; Treaty, art. 83(2), 3, art. 144(b),
art. 146, art. 148, 3; Security Control Convention, art. 13(a).
16. See, for instance, Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace Under Canadian
Bilateral Agreements With Other Nations, 42 DENVER L. CENTER J. 41, 48 (1965).
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and balances is conceived by a careful allocation of the various
types and degrees of authority in terms of people, resources
(values) and institutions; (5) if solutions are attempted on a
step-by-step basis.
Should some progress be made with regard to a more general
acceptance of international control (even a Euratom-type of
"conformity" control) over some or all peaceful nuclear mate-
rials, or with regard to the transfer of such materials, this
would undoubtedly constitute a significant development, even
though such an eventuality would still be a far cry from per-
mitting similar controls over nuclear materials destined for mili-
tary purposes. This impelling truism, which has been reinforced
by Euratom's experience, should put us on guard not to under-
estimate the challenging difficulties which are likely to beset any
attempt to achieve controlled disarmament, particularly in the
nuclear field.
In sum, it would appear that the various international con-
trol systems which have sprung into being have not only made
many nations accustomed to the formerly unpalatable idea and
practice of international inspection, but have also provided an
invaluable testing ground for the concrete assessment of tech-
niques and procedures of international verification in a highly
complex and extremely sensitive area. Thereby, they have laid
the foundations for institutional patterns and experiences which
appropriate disarmament arrangements providing for interna-
tional verification could ill-afford to disregard.
[Vol. XXVII
